The Gap between Defense Policy and Defense Science

It would be great to get both groups in one room at the same time

The Defense Science Board recently released one of its summer studies - well, at least the executive summary of its August 2024 study titled “Future Considerations for Chemical Weapons Demilitarization.” It’s a very short summary, and this post will be very short as well. It’s the holiday season anyway, didn’t think too many people would be looking for serious posts this time of year. The DSB has a Permanent Subcommittee on Threat Reduction that handles most of the unconventional weapons topics. I am not sure who tasked them with this or why at this particular time someone thought this study was necessary. It may be because as Syria was imploding over the last year, someone was concerned that the Army’s experts in chemical demilitarization might be let go because of a lack of current requirements and budget drills.

“This study was undertaken because of increased chemical weapon (CW) production and use worldwide, as well as activities to dispose of certain agents in areas abroad and under the domestic U.S. Chemical Demilitarization Program. Concerns persist that the Department will return to a low level of activity relative to activities targeting biological and nuclear weapons now that these projects are complete, losing expertise and capabilities necessary to disable, destroy, or demilitarize (D3) CW agents that will be costly and time-consuming to reestablish when needed.”

I’ve never heard the term “disable, destroy, or demilitarize” or seen this as a defense acronym (D3). Someone’s making that up to see if it sticks. Doesn’t matter. I just want to know what these eggheads thought they were doing when they came up with these recommendations (discussed below). These are smart people, and I am and will continue to be an advocate for science-based policy making. However, I am not sure that scientists making defense policy when it comes to technical issues is the best course of action. This issue of retaining a chemical demilitarization capability in the Defense Department is a policy issue; however, I don’t see the Defense Policy Board taking this topic on as an agenda item, as they don’t seem to like getting technical.¹

(graphic from “Engaging Early-Career Scientists in Global Policy-Making,” Torsten John et al, Angewandte Chemie, Vol 62, no. 34, June 28, 2023)

The basis for this statement about “increased chemical weapon production and use worldwide” probably refers to the Syrian use of sarin and chlorine after ratifying the CWC in 2013 as well as Russian use of Novichok agents and North Korean use of VX nerve agent as assassination devices (2017-2020). In 2008, the Congressional Research Service estimated that maybe a dozen countries had chemical weapons programs. Today, the number is down to two or three, depending on how you want to count Syria’s undeclared chemical weapons stockpile. I don’t see the “increased chemical weapon production and use” the same way as the DSB, I guess. Chemical weapons are a military threat, and we should take it seriously. At the same time, let’s not overblow it as a world-ending catastrophic event.

Let’s look at the first recommendation:

First, the Department should ensure the maintenance of a chemical weapon D3 program that develops and sustains scalable technologies and expertise for fielding at relevant timescales; develops and demonstrates capabilities to address anticipated threats; and ensures periodic field testing and operational exercises to demonstrate readiness and message U.S. commitment to eliminating CW.

In a year or two, the U.S. Army will have completed close-out operations of its final chemical destruction facilities at Pueblo Chemical Depot and Bluegrass Army Depot. It was a long time coming, overly long and expensive. There will still be a small group of civilians and military personnel who will be ready to destroy non-stockpile chemical munitions that occasionally pop up at formerly used defense sites. It is their job in fact to have “scalable technologies and expertise” to deploy where needed and to render chemical munitions safe. There is also the 20th CBRNE Command and its trained teams that respond to chemical agent incidents. Now, if a larger effort is desired, say, in the event of North Korea collapsing in the near future and someone has to deal with 5,000 tons of chemical agent munitions, that might have to scale up a lot. DoD can use the Cooperative Threat Reduction program through Defense Threat Reduction Agency to hire contractors and to pay government civilians to advise and support a longer term, larger project such as North Korea’s chemical stockpile.

Unless Congress is considering defunding these organizations because nuclear and biological threats continue to steal the limelight, sure, we need to retain this expertise. I don’t foresee that happening, but sure, inform the policy makers that this is still important. However, I am not convinced at all that the DoD needs to publicly exercise these capabilities as a “message” of U.S. commitment to eliminating chemical weapons. Is there any confusion as to who eliminated the chemical weapons in Albania, Libya, or Syria? And what nation other than North Korea should the world be concerned that the U.S. government would not be prepared to assist? I am telling you right now, we’re not going to go into Russia to destroy its chemical weapons, if that opportunity ever arose. This is not a problem as long as the U.S. government can throw hundreds of millions of dollars at it (again), as it did in Syria’s case.

Here’s recommendation number two:

Second, the Department should undertake a comprehensive “Chemical Weapons Deterrence and Defense Posture Review” akin to what has been done for nuclear forces, missile defense, and biodefense. This review should span the nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and chemical defense mission space and lead the development of an implementation plan built upon the priorities and gaps identified.

Okay, first of all, let’s not even pretend that the U.S. military (or State Department) worries about chemical threats to the extent that it worries about nuclear, biological, or missile threats. While adversaries with chemical weapons are a concern, no one in the military is losing sleep over the topic (except maybe those hard-working Army researchers at Edgewood Arsenal). Let’s be very clear that the only reason that the DoD has written “posture reviews” on these topics is because Congress told them to, not because the DoD leadership wanted to, because congresspeople want to be very clear on what the department is doing about existential threats. Chemical weapons are not existential threats. They are manageable risks, even if people are worrying about remnants of the Syrian CW program. Second, let’s be equally clear that the DoD’s Biodefense Posture Review was a piece of garbage and should not in any circumstance be confused as an analytical study with solid policy recommendations.

Should the Department’s leadership, and in particular, OSD Policy, have a serious discussion as to the current and future state of nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities? Absolutely yes. Should OSD Policy be concerned about the U.S. military’s readiness to conduct chemical defense operations in a future military scenario? Again, absolutely yes. Will OSD Policy address either topic in the next four years? Absolutely not. It will not come up because the incoming administration will not see it as a priority. Bank on it. And if the Department’s leadership lets OSD Acquisition and Sustainment write the report, as it did with the Biodefense Posture Review, it will be a train wreck of epic proportions.

I cannot even fathom how OSD acquisition would develop the term chemical threats — would they parallel the biological threats construct, saying that the U.S. military had to be concerned with all chemical threats, whether of natural origin, deliberate incidents, or laboratory accidents? I imagine they wouldn’t, but it’s fun to consider all the ways that the OSD acquisition people and their contractors would screw it up. They don’t do defense policy well, which brings me back to the main point here — neither does the Defense Science Board.

I can’t claim to have read most of the DSB’s reports — they cover a pretty broad range of technically complex issues outside of my usual interests. I appreciate that they have a unique role in advising defense leadership on these topics. But at the end of the day, I have to wonder as to how much of their policy advice goes unheeded because the OSD policy makers are shaking their head, saying “where did they come up with these recommendations?” Science-based policy is important, and we don’t do enough of it. At the same time, scientists unfamiliar with the policy makers’ senses of practicality and experience with crisis management are a hindrance rather than an aid. We need a Defense Science-Policy Integration Board that bridges the two communities, and then maybe these reports will benefit the national security community.

1. For some reason, defense policy makers are reluctant - to the point of absolutely ignoring, military warfare issues associated with chemical or biological weapons. The thought of science-based weapons makes them nauseous and unable to articulate national security positions. All they know about nuclear weapons is that they create a much larger blast. I don’t know if students getting a PhD in international relations necessarily have to take science courses, but it would help them if they did. There are notable exceptions, of course. Ash Carter and Michele Flournoy always struck me as people who did defense policy and technical issues related to unconventional weapons well.