Worrying about Nuclear Terrorism
Lots of rhetoric, but it's not the end of the world
There’s a WaPo article (firewalled) about incoming President Trump’s decision to not consider RFK Jr’s daughter-in-law for the role of deputy director of the CIA because she’s not hawkish enough for Sen. Tom Cotton. For once it’s not a case of lack of practical experience… It’s a shame that the senator won’t let Trump have his preferred political hires (I kid), but that’s not what perked my interest in Amaryllis Fox Kennedy. Here’s the snip:
In her memoir, “Life Undercover: Coming of Age in the C.I.A., Fox Kennedy says she worked in the Clandestine Service, posing as an art dealer and recruiting arms dealers as assets. She also says she was tasked with talking extremists out of setting off dirty bombs.
You don’t say? I have to wonder how that conversation went. “Sure, Movsar, you could certainly steal those cesium rods and make a dirty bomb, but you know, that stuff is very toxic and your bomb-makers will lose their vision and their skin will peel off after working with it. Also, I’ve heard that the CIA has near-earth orbiting satellites that can detect radioactive signatures. In fact, I hear they can put those detectors on Predator drones now. Too risky. Just stick to improvised explosive devices.”
When it comes to discussing nuclear terrorism, it’s important to clarify the difference between a “dirty bomb” and an improvised nuclear device or IND. Too often people (even experts) will discuss both threats under the topic, even as they have very different characteristics. A dirty bomb or radiological dispersal device (RDD) can use any form of radioactive material, using conventional explosives to hurl radiological material in a short distance. Its cousin, the radiological exposure device (RED), can be just a radiological isotope in a box hidden in a public setting. An IND is usually seen as a nuclear weapon that uses special nuclear material (plutonium-239 or uranium-235) with the intent of achieving some kind of yield. An IND may be hand-crafted and untested, or it could be a warhead stolen from a nuclear weapons state. Between the three threats, politicians worry that a sub-state group would bring an IND into the United States to destroy a major metropolitan city.
This usually is expressed in the rhetorical statement “this scenario keeps me up at night” by congresspersons because they all envision this scene.1
This general concern has existed ever since J. Robert Oppenheimer told Congress in 1946 that it was entirely possible that people could smuggle units of an atomic bomb into New York City and detonate it. When asked what instrument officials would need to use to detect a hidden atomic bomb, he replied “a screwdriver [to open up each and every crate or suitcase].” There wasn’t too much to do at the time, but when the Soviet Union fell, the concern about “loose nukes” led to the establishment of the Nunn-Lugar Act in 1991 and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to dismantle the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons and delivery systems. After the 9/11 attack, concern refocused on the possibility that al Qaeda might have a nuclear bomb and could bring it to the United States (spoiler, they didn’t).
You may be familiar with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) that operated under DHS and with DOD support, the idea being that the U.S. government should put radiological detection devices at every border crossing and major seaport so as to interdict any possible nuclear devices coming across the border. Established in 2005, it ran into a bit of controversy over its efforts to modernize its rad detection gear and was folded into the DHS Countering WMD office in 2017. But there are many, many other federal agencies with specialized assets prepared to prevent and respond to a nuclear terrorist incident. The State Department has programs for arms control and combating terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative, DOE has nuclear incident response forces and programs for addressing other countries’ nuclear reactor programs, DHS has the container security initiative at overseas ports-of-departure as well as the DNDO program, DoD has the CBRN Response Force as well as maritime interdiction capabilities, and there are many other federal programs. There have been numerous national-level exercises on the response to a domestic nuclear incident. No federal agency has lost funding by telling Congress that it had available assets to prevent or respond to a domestic nuclear incident.
I was surprised, then, when Dr. Liz Sherwood-Randall, assistant to the president for homeland security, announced in March 2003 that the president had signed National Security Memorandum 19 (NSM-19) titled “Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radiological Material Security.” Here’s the unclassified fact sheet on the NSM. Without going into too much detail, there’s nothing new in the “counter WMD terrorism” policy objectives here. This is the same laundry list that has been in State Department reports for over a decade.2 Just as a side note, Sherwood-Randall has had several government roles in this area, to include being a “WMD Czar” for President Obama, working the Nuclear Security Summit in 2014, and Deputy Secretary of Energy (2014-2017), before becoming the Homeland Security Advisor for President Biden. I don’t doubt her expertise in this field but still do not understand the emphasis on nuclear and radiological security in this NSM.
I’m not doubting the importance of addressing nuclear terrorism, but it’s not a new topic and I don’t see any evidence of the U.S. national preparedness flagging in any way. It was odd to emphasize this area other than maybe to say “we’re on top of this” to a global audience.
This leads me into the real subject of this post, a 2024 report published by the National Academies Press titled “Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction.” This study was executed between 2022-2023 in accordance with a congressional directive (NDAA Act for FY 2022) to study the risks of nuclear terrorism. It was chaired by Stephen Flynn (homeland security expert) and Madelyn Creedon (former DoD/DOE nuke expert). Let me give you the “too long, didn’t read” version. Terrorist groups exist. Nuclear and radiological material could be better secured. Therefore we need to do more (spend more) to manage this risk of nuclear terrorism as a “no-fail mission” even if there is no evidence of an imminent nuclear terrorist attack. I have mixed feelings on the issue.
I’m keenly aware that this is a lousy logic flow in that argument, but that’s genuinely the usual tripe that they put in unclassified reports such as this. No specific groups are named because if we knew that there was a specific sub-state group looking for nukes, there’d be a pretty intense hunt for that group. No actual incidents of nuclear terrorism in forever, but “the consequences are so severe that we cannot take risks.” Yadda yadda yadda.
Let me say from the start that this is a solid report, using up-to-date policy and science-based assessments of the federal government’s approach to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. I might quibble with their use of “prevent, counter, and respond” as a framework for the report instead of the PPD-8’s list of “prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover” but this is how the NNSA outlines its lines of effort, so sure, whatever. NNSA is not the lead government agency in preventing or responding to a domestic nuclear incident, and certainly if you’re writing a report about the “whole-of-government” approach to a terrorist incident, you ought to use the right “lines of effort.” That said, if you’re looking to learn about nuclear terrorism or need a refresher on the players, this is a good report to read.
Before I get into the recommendations, I will point out that the group did make one significant error. In Figure 1-2, they have an “abridged list of U.S. government agencies focused on nuclear terrorism that were able to brief the Academies’ committee” on this subject. Two agencies noticeably absent under the DoD response bar are the 20th CBRNE Command and the National Guard Bureau’s CBRN Response Force. Now you can try to tell me that they’re “CBRN” and not “focused” on nuclear terrorism and I would laugh at you and say “of course they are.”3 DTRA is not “focused” on nuclear terrorism; they have a very broad range of capabilities, but they’re on the chart. If they didn’t talk to the 20th CBRNE or NGB, then that was a significant mistake.
I don’t feel that the recommendations have anything new to offer. Rather, the tone of the study is that the U.S. government needs to pay more attention to combating terrorism (hard to believe that this might have diminished, but okay),4 and that the existing programs of record need to be re-emphasized or revitalized. My takeaway was that there is nothing new that needs to happen as much as someone in the National Security Council needs to have an interagency talk to make sure everyone is up to speed. The recommendations include (restating due to their length):
Maintain combating terrorism as a strategic priority and ensure that senior leaders at key agencies stay engaged on the topic. So yeah, this seems very self-evident. It’s literally in their strategies and they talk to Congress about it. I understand that, given the complete lack of any domestic nuclear incident in the 21st century, people may be a little lax, so run some tabletops. Get a refresher.
Have DHS lead an interagency effort to raise public awareness and understanding about the possible use of misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information during major crises. Okay, not specific to nuclear terrorism, but useful, I guess. I have absolutely zero faith that this will happen under the Trump administration, and I’m not sure that DHS is the right agency, but it makes sense.
Conduct a review of counterterrorism programs and agency budgets to ensure that the U.S. government is not underinvesting in essential capabilities required to manage and respond to nuclear terrorism. This would be very difficult, in that there are a lot of general intelligence, diplomatic, economic, and military tools that address terrorism in general. Which ones do you decide are nuclear-focused? I don’t see the NSC doing this and I don’t think the OPM has the talent-pool to figure this out either. Not going to happen.
Examine anti-government/terrorist groups operating in the United States to see if the U.S. government can place them on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list, which would limit their funding and support by international groups. Again, not a bad idea, but not specific to nuclear terrorism. Is it going to happen in the next four years when the focus will be on migrant workers?
Use the DoD’s definitions of “extremist activities” and “active participation” in the investigative standards for all government workers and contractors who have access to sensitive information and facilities, so as to vet those with U.S. security clearances. Sure, standardized definitions would be good. But again, not to sound like a broken record, not specific to nuclear terrorism and not implementable under the Trump administration.
Prioritize and provide oversight of “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-nation” efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, including strengthening and extending ongoing nonproliferation and counterproliferation programs. AMEN. Is it going to happen? Nope. We have a lousy track record of “whole-of-government/whole-of-nation” efforts because no one changes their budgets, so no one volunteers to do more or change what they’re doing.
Provide strong and visible leadership to the world on combating the threat of nuclear terrorism, as it has done in the past. Yeah, those nuclear security summits were great for international discussions. It’s not new, it’s not gonna happen in the near term, but it’s a good recommendation. Will depend on the State Department in particular to lead the discussion.
Strengthen the U.S. presence in civil nuclear energy commerce and enhance global standards for safety, security, and materials control. Sure. I think DOE already does a lot in this area and should continue to do so, if given the chance to spend funds on something other than nuclear weapons.
Prioritize the effort to secure, consolidate, or eliminate civilian special nuclear materials and treat it as a core national security objective. Yes, again, a great idea, and the U.S. government should start by ignoring the NIMBY crowd and opening up Yucca Mountain as a national nuclear fuel repository site. Right after that, the USG can tell the rest of the world to follow its example.
Strengthen and accelerate current national and international activities and programs for end-of-life management of radiological sources. Again, not a new idea, just put more money into it. Give grants to the states. Makes sense.
Expand efforts to phase out high-risk cesium-137 and cobalt-60 sources by developing reliable alternative technologies. Ah, yes, “reliable alternative technologies.” That’s always a good call but you have to convince industry that they work as well as the current system, and I think that’s the hold-up. In the meantime, work on the security systems and accountability methods.
Lead an international effort to enhance security across all elements of the global supply system. There already is a significant “Global Nuclear Detection Architecture” out there, but it’s expensive, it slows down global commerce, and it can’t cover “all elements” of the supply system. Given that the threat of nuclear terrorism is a very, very low probability event, this isn’t worth the squeeze. Ask anyone who follows global drug trafficking or human smuggling,
Continue to deepen ongoing international law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing to counter nuclear smuggling efforts. Again, not a new effort, just a note to examine what we’re doing today and make sure everyone knows who to talk to about nuclear terrorism when an actual crisis does come about. Just as with any disaster response/incident response effort, it’s all about partnerships and knowing who one’s counterparts are.
Re-invigorate the national-level exercise program to develop and coordinate radiological prevention and preparedness policies and procedures. Basically, this is a call to get the state and local agencies as well as private sector more engaged in exercises so that everyone can identify gaps and figure out work-arounds. Sure. But we already do this. Do more? What about the much more probable high-consequence events like natural disasters and chemical spills?
Empower local response by clarifying the agency responsible for providing federal interagency coordination and oversight of developing response tools. Ah, isn’t that DHS? This might be limited due to DHS budget and the fact that the state/local law enforcement and response agencies are so different across the nation. There is no way to standardize this. It’s amazing that we have a National
Incident Management System that everyone agreed to use.
Support adequate resources for consequence management programs that are key to a nuclear incident response. Spend More Money. This is the one recommendation that I’ll say is naive to suggest. OF COURSE the states and locals have inadequate response capabilities to address a nuclear terrorist incident. They have trouble working severe weather events without assistance from other states, the National Guard, DoD, and DHS/FEMA. If the states are given the opportunity to lobby Congress for funding specific to nuclear terrorism response, EVERYTHING that they do for incident response will be related to nuclear. Count on it. This is what the states who hosted chemical weapons destruction facilities did. Alabama got its state-of-the-art state emergency management building constructed by federal money. Disasters are always local, the locals are always in charge of disaster response, but they’re not going to budget for a response capability.
I really do like this report, there’s nothing fundamentally wrong with it other than it’s unrealistic to think that anyone in the federal government is going to act upon its recommendations. And that’s a problem with a lot of the National Academies’ reports. They have very smart people with great credentials, and they have lots of good ideas. But they can’t be implemented in the U.S. government because of the way that U.S. politics plays out. Countering nuclear terrorism is such a niche topic within the greater realm of combating terrorism, that people are counting on existing methods in place for counterterrorism to take care of the bad actors seeking nuclear weapons or radiological materials. Lacking a clear case of a transregional sub-group moving to obtain and transport a nuclear weapon, there’s no motive here to change behaviors.
Here’s how this report is going to be received by Congress.
“Thank you for your continued interest in national security. We appreciate the great work that your group has done and will seriously consider these recommendations. In the near term, we see that the federal agencies who are stakeholders addressing the global threat of nuclear terrorism already have existing programs and are faithfully executing them. We welcome their testimony on the topic and specifically their recommendations on what their budget does not cover. Given that there have been zero nuclear terrorist incidents of any kind in the United States, we are heartened by the good work that these agencies are doing and expect them to continue their vigilance. In the meantime, Congress is expected to be a good executor of U.S. tax dollars and will zealously ensure that funding goes to prevention efforts by our law enforcement, intelligence community, and the military services who seek out, track, and take out transregional terrorist threats to the United States.”
Those of us in the counter-WMD community already know how the leadership in the executive and legislative branches feel about low probability/high consequence events. They provide a minimal budget to ensure that there is at least a limited capability to protect against the use of unconventional weapons. Nuclear terrorism represents the least likely of all forms of unconventional weapons. Chemical weapons are a much more likely form of weaponry than biological or nuclear, but it’s not as much of a mass casualty weapon so it’s often disregarded. It’s hard to see any risk management analysis in this area, and there is even less effort to integrate the technical nature of unconventional weapons to national security issues.
Let me say in passing that not all programs designed to counter nuclear terrorism are good. In 2006, DHS created a “Securing the Cities” program that placed radiological detectors throughout New York City — on highways, on bridges, in tunnels, and in police cars — for the purposes of quickly tracking and intercepting a group transporting a radiological or nuclear device. This was supposed to be a three-year pilot program to determine the feasibility of such a exercise. The program had significant challenges in both operational and technical execution, but it also had an ardent champion in Congress (Rep. Peter King) to defend it. King pushed to have DHS continue to fund the NYC pilot program and insisted that it be expanded to other cities. As government programs can do, it grew from 1 metro area in 2010 to five by 2017 and was approved to be implemented in 13 cities in 2020. This is not based on any risk assessment demonstrating a threat or lack of state/local capabilities but rather because it’s federally funded and congresspersons want it because radiation is scary and bad actors exist. It ought to be funded by the state emergency management agencies, if they feel that the risk of bad actors using radiological devices exists.
The federal programs that currently exist for preventing, protecting against, and responding to nuclear terrorism will continue to exist. They won’t get larger, they won’t get better, they will just continue. There will not be a nuclear terrorist incident in the United States as long as preventive measures are well-funded. At the same time, it’s great that DOE has successfully worked to get other nations who have nuclear reactors to reduce the use of or safeguard special nuclear material. That’s the best that we can get. Kudos to the National Academies for publishing a great report, but that’s all, folks. It won’t get any better than what we have now, and it’s probably good enough considering the likelihood of this particular unconventional threat.
These are quotes from 2014 but they probably are still the same. Strong concern for the consequences, strong desire for oversight of responsible federal agencies, no desire to go crazy with bucketloads of money.
This is not to say that it’s a bad list, on the contrary, it’s a very good list and represents an interagency approach to WMD terrorism. The Bush, Obama, and Trump administration all used the same approximate language (see https://warontherocks.com/2018/12/the-new-u-s-strategy-to-tackle-wmd-terrorism-is-new-wine-in-old-wineskins/).
Given the U.S. government’s extensive involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts that featured sub-state groups, the intelligence community’s depth of expertise in monitoring these groups, and the U.S. military’s deep ties with other nations’ militaries that include counter-terrorism exercises and operations, you’d think that no one has to “increase” emphasis in this particular area.