What's in the ODNI's Threat Report?

The assessment of adversary nations' nuclear and other WMD programs looks a little different this year

Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard was on the Hill last week with CIA Director John Ratcliffe, FBI Director Kash Patel, and the directors of the National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency to present the unclassified Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) to the Senate Intelligence Committee. Much of the hearing focused on the recent Signal controversy involving Atlantic reporter Jeffrey Goldblum, but I’m more interested in the information as to the threat posed by nations with nuclear (and other WMD) programs.¹ I won’t be talking about Signal Gate as others are more competently addressing that clusterfuck issue.

On the one hand, this 2025 report is a very general and short summary that, in its unclassified form, presents more questions than answers. Given the short narrative, it’s a guessing game to try to understand the degree of resolution on what exactly the challenge is and what requires a U.S. response. On the other hand, this is all we (non-governmental policy analysts and academics) have to source as official government information that may lead us to further discussions on what the U.S. government is and is not doing. Because this is a short report, the authors deliberately select certain words and emphasize particular sections that support the administration’s political agenda. For instance, it’s been noted that this ATA ignores the threat of climate change, which is the first time in over a decade that this has happened. Not a big surprise but disappointing in that you’d hope that the ODNI would have a more non-partisan approach to threats to U.S. national security. But these are not ordinary times.

So what do we have in this year’s report? What has changed from the 2024 ATA, other than it shrank from 40 pages to 30 pages? For one, the 2025 report flipped the order of the discussion, putting transnational actors before major state actors. The new report does not cover “contested spaces” that included disruptive technology and digital authoritarianism, and there is no “shared domains” section that covers health security or migration. Does the change of focus and choice of words matter? Let’s discuss.

One of the things that really jumped out at me is that the 2025 ATA has no discussion about the possibility of terrorists using CBRN hazards against U.S. national security interests. In 2024, we saw this under “Non-State Actor Issues":

Terrorists will maintain an interest in conducting attacks using chemical, biological and radioactive materials against U.S. persons, allies, and interests worldwide. Terrorists from diverse ideological backgrounds continue to circulate instructions of varied credibility for the procurement or production of toxic or radioactive weapons using widely available materials in social media and online fora.

Now this has been the general boilerplate language that the U.S. government has used for the past twenty years. It doesn’t tell us much, other than a terrorist CBR incident could happen, someday, maybe.² I’ve always found it fascinating that the intelligence community does not say “terrorist WMD capabilities,” but they cite concern as to terrorists using “chemical, biological and radiological materials” instead. I find that entirely appropriate, that we ought to distinguish terrorist ambitions as going for CBR hazards and not seeking a WMD capability. The general desire to hype the terrorist threat as a monolithic, ever-present threat of terrorist nuclear fire has always been a distraction from those of us seeking to address this threat responsibly. But in the 2025 ATA, we see … absolutely nothing on terrorist CBR threats.³

Now to be fair, the 2025 ATA does have a section on “nonstate transnational criminal and terrorists,” but it stays on the administration’s priorities of illicit drug production and trafficking, and potential attacks on Americans using conventional weapons and explosives. Does that mean that the threat of domestic terrorist CBR incidents has vanished? Has the U.S. government successfully eliminated that capability from their arsenal? Doubtful. I don’t think that any particular U.S. programs will be cut as a result of the exclusion of any mention of terrorist CBR threats, but as anyone working in the Beltway understands, if your project isn’t mentioned in national security guidance documents, then you ought to be worried.

Both the 2024 and 2025 ATAs hit on the big four nation-state adversaries — Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. No surprise there, they’ve been the bad guys for a long time.⁴ In 2024, we saw this narrative about Russia:

Russia will continue to modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities and maintains the largest and most diverse nuclear weapons stockpile. Moscow views its nuclear capabilities as necessary for maintaining deterrence and achieving its goals in a potential conflict against the United States and NATO, and it sees this as the ultimate guarantor of the Russian Federation.

Moscow will continue to develop long-range nuclear-capable missiles and underwater delivery systems meant to penetrate or bypass U.S. missile defenses. Russia is expanding and modernizing its large and diverse set of nonstrategic systems, which are capable of delivering nuclear or conventional warheads, because Moscow believes such systems offer options to deter adversaries, control the escalation of potential hostilities, and counter U.S. and Allied conventional forces.

Russia will continue to pose a CBW threat. Scientific institutes there have researched and developed CBW capabilities, including technologies to deliver CBW agents. Russia retains an undeclared chemical weapons program and has used chemical weapons at least twice during recent years: in assassination attempts with Novichok nerve agents, also known as fourth-generation agents, against Russian opposition leader Aleksey Navalny in 2020 and against UK citizen Sergey Skripal and his daughter Yuliya Skripal on UK soil in 2018.

In the latest ATA, we now see:

Russia has the largest and most diverse nuclear weapons stockpile that, along with its deployed ground-, air-, and sea-based delivery systems, could inflict catastrophic damage to the Homeland. Russia has developed a more modernized, mobile, and survivable strategic nuclear force that is intended to circumvent or neutralize future augmented U.S. missile defense and ensure deterrence through reliable retaliatory strike potential. In addition, Russia’s vast arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons helps it to offset Western conventional superiority and provide formidable escalation management options in theater war scenarios.

Russia’s CBW threat is expanding. Russian scientific institutes continue to research and develop CBW capabilities, including technologies to deliver CBW agents. Russia retains an undeclared chemical weapons program and has used chemical weapons at least twice during recent years in assassination attempts with Novichok nerve agents, also known as fourth-generation agents, against Russian opposition leader Aleksey Navalny in 2020, and against U.K. citizen Sergey Skripal and his daughter Yuliya Skripal on U.K. soil in 2018. Russian forces almost certainly continue using chemicals against Ukrainian forces, with hundreds of reported attacks occurring since late 2022.

There are some interesting differences here. The discussion of Russia’s nuclear capabilities has been embellished, with language that includes “catastrophic damage to the Homeland.” There’s a change in focus from Russia as a competitor with the United States to Russia as an active aggressor. It implies that the United States is behind the curve and could be meant to justify an increased nuclear posture and national missile defense program. Similarly, the CBW threat has changed from “continue to pose” to “is expanding.” I don’t question that Russia has an undeclared chemical weapons program, but I am not clear that Russian use of riot-control agents in Ukraine constitutes an expansion of its program. Similarly, I haven’t seen any open-source discussion of Russian BW efforts.

There is a line in both reports that caution about the potential use of nuclear weapons as the Russia-Ukraine war continues. No surprise there, but it’s always a point of debate as to whether Putin is just saber-rattling or if he actually might use them.

China’s WMD section got a lot shorter between the two years. In 2024, we saw this:

China remains intent on orienting its nuclear posture for strategic rivalry with the United States because its leaders have concluded their current capabilities are insufficient. Beijing worries that bilateral tension, U.S. nuclear modernization, and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) advancing conventional capabilities have increased the likelihood of a U.S. first strike. As its nuclear force grows, Beijing’s confidence in its nuclear deterrent probably will bolster the PRC’s resolve and intensify conventional conflicts.

China probably possesses capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare (CBW) that pose a threat to U.S., allied, and partner forces as well as civilian populations.

Compare this to the 2025 report.

China remains intent on modernizing, diversifying, and expanding its nuclear posture. China’s nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems pose a direct threat to the Homeland and are capable of delivering catastrophic damage to the United States and threatening U.S. military forces here and abroad.

China most likely possesses capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare (CBW) that pose a threat to U.S., allied, and partner forces as well as civilian populations.

Again, we see a much stronger emphasis on the message that the threat of nuclear catastrophe is already here. There’s a difference between saying “China wants a nuclear deterrent so that it can do more conventional stuff” and “China poses a direct threat to the U.S. homeland.” I’m not sure that the heavy-handed language is justified other than to encourage more funding for a national missile defense program and more operational nuclear weapons. On China’s CBW threat, who knows, there’s no evidence here of Chinese use or intentions. No one really understands (in my opinion) what China intends to do with CB weapons, so we all point to the possibility that China COULD do something with CB weapons, but it’s all hypothetical.⁵ Russia had a clear history in CB warfare concepts and strategy. China doesn’t, so it’s hard to figure out what China wants to do with CB weapons.

What about Iran? It’s always interesting to see how the second-string WMD actors are doing. In 2024, we saw this:

Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device. Since 2020, however, Tehran has stated that it is no longer constrained by any JCPOA limits, and Iran has greatly expanded its nuclear program, reduced IAEA monitoring, and undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.

Iran probably aims to continue research and development of chemical and biological agents for offensive purposes. Iranian military scientists have researched chemicals, toxins, and bioregulators, all of which have a wide range of sedation, dissociation, and amnestic incapacitating effects.

In 2025, the assessment is not too different. This year’s ATA says:

We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, though pressure has probably built on him to do so. In the past year, there has been an erosion of a decades-long taboo on discussing nuclear weapons in public that has emboldened nuclear weapons advocates within Iran’s decision-making apparatus. Khamenei remains the final decision-maker over Iran’s nuclear program, to include any decision to develop nuclear weapons.

Iran very likely aims to continue R&D of chemical and biological agents for offensive purposes. Iranian military scientists have researched chemicals that have a wide range of sedation, dissociation, and amnestic incapacitating effects, and can also be lethal.

It’s pretty similar language; we see the same concern about a potential increase of the threat that Iran poses in its game of “will he or won’t he build a nuclear device.” Interesting (unsurprising) how the 2025 ATA ignores the JCPOA issue. We see a change in the Iranian CBW as moving from “probably aims to continue R&D” to “is very likely to continue R&D.” Both assessments hit on the concern that Iran may be looking at central-nervous acting chemicals but doesn’t talk about the rationale or concept of use, i.e., is that for battlefield use or internal security operations?

This leaves with our perennial bad boy, Kim Jong Un. What’s going on in North Korea? In 2024, the ODNI said:

Kim remains strongly committed to expanding the country’s nuclear weapons arsenal, which serves as the centerpiece of his national security structure.

North Korea maintains its CBW capabilities, and Pyongyang may use such weapons during a conflict or in an unconventional or clandestine attack.

This hasn’t changed too much in this year’s report, other than adding a little more detail as to the possible ambitions of the Dear Leader.

Kim remains committed to increasing the number of North Korea’s nuclear warheads and improving its missile capabilities to threaten the Homeland and U.S. forces, citizens, and allies, and to weaken U.S. power in the Asia-Pacific region, as evidenced by the pace of the North’s missile flight tests and the regime’s public touting of its uranium enrichment capabilities. North Korea is probably prepared to conduct a nuclear test and continues to flight test ICBMs so Kim can threaten the Homeland. Russia is increasingly supporting North Korea’s nuclear status in exchange for Pyongyang’s support to Moscow’s war against Ukraine.

North Korea maintains its CBW capabilities and may use such weapons in a conflict or in an unconventional or clandestine attack against the United States or its allies.

The intelligence community’s assessment of NK CBW hasn’t changed at all. Hasn’t changed in over 20 years, which sometimes seems odd, boring even, considering that we do have U.S. troops in range of those delivery systems. Again, we see a stronger emphasis here describing a nuclear missile threat to the U.S. homeland. If only we could construct a magical “Golden Dome” over the entire United States that didn’t cost trillions of dollars to develop and operationalize. Ah well.

What does it all mean? There’s a lot of continuity between the two reports (as one might hope) but I think you can see a bit of politicization in the 2025 report. The intelligence community’s assessment supports the U.S. military’s planned nuclear modernization program. General Anthony Cotton, U.S. Strategic Command, talked about these threats in more detail just last week and why it was necessary to “maintain flexible nuclear capabilities and tailored deterrence strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best judgment of their decision-making and perceptions to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and conflicts.” The U.S. nuclear modernization program has had some significant cost/schedule slips over the past few years, and so it never hurts to point out that the bad guys have a significant nuclear capability that requires an effective (modernized) response. Damn the costs, this is about an EXISTENTIAL THREAT. Still a lot of details that could be debated as to how many nukes (and what kinds) are enough to deter, whether national missile defense is just a money sink or a necessary capability, and if the United States will ever get arms control back on the docket.

In terms of arms control, the intelligence community’s assessment of the Big Four’s CB warfare programs may be intended to justify the need for continued U.S. leadership in arms control and nonproliferation activities.⁶ While arms control and nonproliferation activities have, in general, faltered over the past decade and remain unsupported by a Republican-majority Congress, it remains vital to have U.S. representation on these issues to at least ensure that nuclear-weapon states in particular do not feel unconstrained in their development and use of CB weapons. By participating in international arms control discussions, the U.S. government can at least bring its significant political and diplomatic power to publicly examine and call out violations of treaty. These arms control and nonproliferation activities act to shape international norms and values.

It would be nice if leadership in the Department of Defense acknowledged that Russia and China had CB weapons capabilities designed for major conflicts, and asked some tough questions as to how the use of said weapons in a future military conflict might impact U.S. forces. I say this with some tongue in cheek, because while there is a chemical-biological defense community within the U.S. military that contemplates this possibility, certainly no one above the rank of colonel/captain does to any great effect.⁷ No think tanks are looking at this topic, although they seem to find time to talk about fighting Russia and China in conventional regional conflicts. The DoD CB Defense Program has had a relatively flat budget for quite a few years, while its leadership has decided to move funds into capabilities for countering natural disease outbreaks and pandemic preparedness. I hope that it will not take another crisis like the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict to recognize the challenges that the Department has in protecting its service members and bases from this continued threat.

1. Yes, the general format in this Annual Threat Assessment is exactly why I named my Substack newsletter what it is. Routinely, US govt agencies will create a “WMD threats” section in their reports and it will always focus on nuclear weapons, with a side glance at chemical and biological weapons. It’s a time-honored tradition that is particularly annoying.

2. The usual rationale behind this weak statement is that technical information and materials to craft toxic CBR hazards are more widely available as part of a global economy, so it’s possible that some terrorist group (no one in particular) could figure it out.

3. The 2025 ATA hits the issue of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids as “the most lethal drugs trafficked into the United States” but that’s a law enforcement issue and not a WMD issue. The 2024 ATA did the same. But fentanyl is not in and of itself a chemical weapon.

4. In these quotes, I’m leaving out some of the paragraphs that go into detail. I’m looking for more of a side-by-side comparison, and the extra wordage, while interesting, isn’t necessary for this thought experiment.

5. Again, I’m not going to speculate about China’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic or its biotechnology capabilities. That’s related to, but not specifically, biological warfare.

6. Then again, having the mentions of CB weapons in the ATAs may just be another rationale to why the U.S. military needs more nuclear weapons to deter unconventional weapons use.

7. I offered a few thoughts about envisioning a new strategy to counter great power use of WMD in 2022. Didn’t really get much traction, too cerebral for the acquisition community.