Glad to see Al wading into this territory, which could use more analysis.
It was my understanding that the Russians were using both riot control agents (like CS or CN) *and* chloropicirin--which is not classed as a riot control agent, because of its physical properties and because it is listed in, i.e. restricted by, the Schedules of the Chemical Weapons Convention--and mostly the former and only a little of the latter. The former has apparently been delivered via gas grenades, often dropped from drones; I haven't seen any specific information about how the latter has supposedly been delivered.
There's also some evidence that Ukrainian forces are also using riot control agents, via gas grenades dropped from drones, possibly munitions captured from Russian forces.
Al says, "The Russians kept chloropicrin for training purposes and for riot control, perhaps because they don’t care as much about long-term health effects." That's intriguing; I'm curious what the source might be.
The whole question of whether and under what conditions military forces should be allowed to use riot control agents is a thorny one. One facet of that is that if riot control agents are allowed to be used for domestic law enforcement, can they be used during military occupations of foreign territory? The parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention appear to have decided not to clarify that for now. And as Al notes, the US has long reserved the right to use riot control operations in military operations more generally, under specific circumstances and subject to high-level authorization, and in tension with the Chemical Weapons Convention as it currently stands.
Statecraft is often about give and take via treaty verbiage. The effectiveness of US use of tear gas in combat in Vietnam can be debated; what is not debateable is that the US hasn’t used it since, and a couple war colleges teach the Mayaguez incident as an example of how CS should not be used in combat operations.
More importantly is the adage “it’s not not that you win, but how you win.” In a world of cameras in every hand, the widespread use of an RCA in combat operations is potentially detrimental to the life of the CWC. There is no way to tell which type of gas is being used and it risks normalizing gas use in warfare.
There is an argument to be made that the US should alter its stance on the CWC to exclude the use of any gas, including RCAs , in combat operations, to include low intensity conflicts. This move would bring the US in line with just about every other CWC signatory, and reduce the ambiguity surrounding RCAs.
RCAs are being used today in warfare in Ukraine, Palestine, Myanmar,and Iraq. This increase is spurred not only by a lack of global repulsion, but also the emergence of drone deployment of RCAs reducing the exposure to friendly forces. Increased prevalence of gas in combat increases global risk to US forces for many reasons, not the least of which is, as you pointed out, the US CBDP budget.
Hi Gary, I agree with all your points, just to say, it's important to keep the CWC as a viable tool, but that shouldn't stop us from reviewing RCA use in tactical situations given that the US executive order is 50 years old and based in Vietnam scenarios. Not saying that I agree with John Spencer but I would just like to see more discussion on this topic.
Whatever may happen on the chemical war front, the underlying equation would seem to remain the same. The knowledge explosion is providing violent men with ever more, ever larger powers, at what seems an accelerating pace. It seems important that we put technical details in to this larger context, because if we can't fix the underlying problem, the details may not matter.
Glad to see Al wading into this territory, which could use more analysis.
It was my understanding that the Russians were using both riot control agents (like CS or CN) *and* chloropicirin--which is not classed as a riot control agent, because of its physical properties and because it is listed in, i.e. restricted by, the Schedules of the Chemical Weapons Convention--and mostly the former and only a little of the latter. The former has apparently been delivered via gas grenades, often dropped from drones; I haven't seen any specific information about how the latter has supposedly been delivered.
There's also some evidence that Ukrainian forces are also using riot control agents, via gas grenades dropped from drones, possibly munitions captured from Russian forces.
Al says, "The Russians kept chloropicrin for training purposes and for riot control, perhaps because they don’t care as much about long-term health effects." That's intriguing; I'm curious what the source might be.
The whole question of whether and under what conditions military forces should be allowed to use riot control agents is a thorny one. One facet of that is that if riot control agents are allowed to be used for domestic law enforcement, can they be used during military occupations of foreign territory? The parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention appear to have decided not to clarify that for now. And as Al notes, the US has long reserved the right to use riot control operations in military operations more generally, under specific circumstances and subject to high-level authorization, and in tension with the Chemical Weapons Convention as it currently stands.
Statecraft is often about give and take via treaty verbiage. The effectiveness of US use of tear gas in combat in Vietnam can be debated; what is not debateable is that the US hasn’t used it since, and a couple war colleges teach the Mayaguez incident as an example of how CS should not be used in combat operations.
More importantly is the adage “it’s not not that you win, but how you win.” In a world of cameras in every hand, the widespread use of an RCA in combat operations is potentially detrimental to the life of the CWC. There is no way to tell which type of gas is being used and it risks normalizing gas use in warfare.
There is an argument to be made that the US should alter its stance on the CWC to exclude the use of any gas, including RCAs , in combat operations, to include low intensity conflicts. This move would bring the US in line with just about every other CWC signatory, and reduce the ambiguity surrounding RCAs.
RCAs are being used today in warfare in Ukraine, Palestine, Myanmar,and Iraq. This increase is spurred not only by a lack of global repulsion, but also the emergence of drone deployment of RCAs reducing the exposure to friendly forces. Increased prevalence of gas in combat increases global risk to US forces for many reasons, not the least of which is, as you pointed out, the US CBDP budget.
Hi Gary, I agree with all your points, just to say, it's important to keep the CWC as a viable tool, but that shouldn't stop us from reviewing RCA use in tactical situations given that the US executive order is 50 years old and based in Vietnam scenarios. Not saying that I agree with John Spencer but I would just like to see more discussion on this topic.
I do think it’s a topic on the near horizon.
Whatever may happen on the chemical war front, the underlying equation would seem to remain the same. The knowledge explosion is providing violent men with ever more, ever larger powers, at what seems an accelerating pace. It seems important that we put technical details in to this larger context, because if we can't fix the underlying problem, the details may not matter.