Eliminating the DHS CWMD Office Is A Bad Idea
But not a complete surprise, given the lack of emphasis in this area
Back in April, I talked about Josh Marshall’s picking up an indication that DOGE was looking to axe the DHS Countering WMD Office. As with any federal program or agency, it’s entirely possible as a result of policy evaluations that the U.S. government might decide to scale back or eliminate particular functions. Certainly we’ve seen enough of that this year (albeit without much justification or thought). But it looks like the Trump administration is set on eliminating that office in the issuance of DHS’s FY2006 budget. This involves an office with a budget of around $410 million and a staff of 286 people, who will be reassigned within other DHS offices.
In a sweeping structural overhaul outlined in the FY 2026 Congressional Budget Justification, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposes the complete disbanding and redistribution of its Office for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). The reorganization builds on years of leadership vacuums and strategic drift that began under the Trump-Pence Administration (2017–2021), during which the CWMD Office experienced significant attrition, with key leadership positions left unfilled or occupied by acting officials for extended periods. These vacancies, coupled with inconsistent funding and oversight, weakened national coordination for CBRNE defense.
The Biden-Harris Administration (2021–2025) took steps to reestablish the CWMD Office’s relevance—stabilizing funding, reaffirming strategic priorities such as biosurveillance and threat assessment, and reinforcing the office’s interagency engagement. However, CWMD never fully recovered its operational authority or institutional cohesion during that period.
Now, under the Trump-Vance Administration (2025–present), DHS has formalized the full dissolution of CWMD in the FY 2026 budget request—transferring all personnel, programs, and budget authority to other DHS components. The move is framed by DHS as a way to “create synergies and efficiencies” by aligning capabilities with mission-executing components. For many in the CBRNE, biosecurity, and national preparedness communities, however, it represents a profound structural break from the centralized WMD countermeasure model that had served as a federal coordination hub for over a decade.
I wish I could say that this action to eliminate the DHS CWMD office is not an absolute given, that the Congress does has an opportunity to reverse this action and keep the office alive. It’s in their interest to maintain a function that’s valued by the state and local emergency management agencies, in particular those in red states. But we’re talking about a Republican Congress that isn’t interested in countering this president’s direction, regardless of the consequences. In 2018, the Trump administration tried to shave off millions of dollars from this office and Congress reversed it. Not sure this is going to happen with this Congress. The DHS FY2006 Congressional Budget Justification identifies the transfer of personnel and funding of specific programs to other parts of DHS. The Global Biodefense staff helpfully identifies these moves in its article.
I recommend that you go to the Global Biodefense website to read out the changes. I’m not going to duplicate their work, which is pretty much repeating what’s seen in the DHS CWMD budget proposal. I’ll tell you what I think is strange (illogical) about the proposed changes though. For one, they want to move the National Biosurveillance Integration Center to the DHS Office of Health Security, which was just re-established three years ago, but NOT the BioWatch program. How does it make sense to not place the national biodetection and analysis network in the Office of Health Security, which is “the principal medical, workforce health and safety, and public health authority for DHS”? Project BioWatch was originally in the Office of Health Affairs, the predecessor of the Office of Health Security, so there is precedent here to put it in the hands of medical professionals.
They’re passing the responsibility of CBRN risk and detection architecture to DHS’s Office of the Secretary and Executive Management, which seems to be a catchall office for functions that don’t really fit neatly into any other department. I’m sure that this office will flourish in that sterile environment. “Mobile Detection Deployment” (providing assistance to national special security events), CBRN defense training and exercises, and “Securing the Cities” is going to CISA’s Infrastructure Security Division. CISA has never done CBRN before but allegedly this will “integrate” CBRN defense into the mainstream infrastructure protection program. I get this. Done right, it would be a good thing. I wish that DoD’s defense critical infrastructure office would pay attention to CBRN threats, but they don’t.1 If there was anything that could have really been just axed and left on the floor, it’s “Securing the Cities.” I would suggest that the Trump administration put its money where its mouth is and let the states and major cities manage these functions out of their own funding and authorities. That would strengthen the “integration” of CBRN defense into state and local emergency management agencies and make clear whether those functions are important to maintain by the states.
The Coast Guard gets CBRNE research and development, to which I have to really say, “Huh?” Makes no sense. Why not give the mission back to the Science and Technology Directorate, which used to do this job before the CWMD office stood up. Completely weird decision, other than maybe to get more funding to the Coast Guard so as to develop its HAZMAT response teams to better execute interdiction missions. And I don’t doubt that the Coast Guard could use a little love to fund additional special CBRN gear, but that’s not an R&D function. The Customs and Border Patrol get the radiation portal monitor support mission, which sure, is part of their job, but I’m not sure they have the acquisition skills to manage it. It’s like the Army deciding that infantry battalions can manage their own NBC rooms without a Chemical Corps service member actually making sure it gets done. Sure, the infantry guys could, if they tried real hard, manage the necessary individual and collective CBRN defense gear that it needs to sustain operations in a CBRN environment. But they won’t.2 Neither will the CBP unless immigrants are carrying radioactive isotopes on them.
The thing I don’t get at all in this budget drill is that this proposal is essentially chopping up and redistributing personnel and funds across DHS. There are no cost savings here. There are no “efficiencies” gained. Losing a central executive authority to manage DHS CBRNE issues means that it “may make it difficult for industry, academia, and local responders to engage with DHS on integrated CBRNE solutions.” It also “raises the risk of duplication, uneven prioritization, and diminished capacity to respond to emerging or cross-cutting WMD threats.” These are the Global Biodefense staff’s words, and they’re right on target. They are eliminating DHS’s ability to grow and maintain a group of dedicated professionals who span the breadth and depth of WMD preparedness and response efforts for the nation. This will come back to bite the U.S. government in the ass.
I’ll go one further here. This move doesn’t merely demonstrate the incompetency of the DOGE efforts to dismantle the federal government. There’s a deeper malaise in the national security community in that there is no “national strategy” to combat WMD anymore. The only national strategy to combat WMD was written in 2002 and it was never updated. I’ve never understood why the Obama administration sat on its ass for seven years and let the clock run out on updating this strategy, especially after the WMD fiasco in Operation Iraqi Freedom.3 I am not necessarily a fan of “national strategies” that do not actually improve the state of readiness of the nation, but it’s a fact that there is no real proponency for this mission anymore. There is no active proponency within the Department of Defense either, but that’s a different story.4 If Congress approves this budget proposal, then they see no need for a federal agency to develop and manage nation-wide programs that prepare state and local agencies to respond to a domestic CBRN incident. And this indifference is what defunds policy programs. It’s literally Congress’s job to oversee these issues and they aren’t doing it.
Twenty years ago, you consistently heard about the threat of CBRNE attacks or the shortcomings within the federal government as to its ability to support state and local responses to domestic CBRN incidents. The public health community was crying every day as billions of dollars went to BioWatch and BioShield efforts. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office had big ambitions. It wasn’t just putting radiation detectors at the border - DNDO wanted radiacs in every large and small airport, in every seaport and wharf, and in every major city as well. People were worrying about potential attacks against chemical industry plants and nuclear reactors and came up with increased security measures to make it harder to release toxic hazards. Now, all those worries have faded away, given the lack of any significant incidents.
I’ve heard that DOGE may be looking at the DoD Chemical-Biological Defense Program for “efficiencies” to be gained by cutting personnel. Given this action with DHS, I think they’d be missing a big opportunity to “mainstream” the program back into the services’ budgets and to cut ASD(NCB) and DASD(CBRND) civilian and contractor positions. But they probably don’t have the stones for that level of action. A lot of the same challenges would be there, notably if the absence of a centralized program would result in the services ignoring CBRN defense readiness (again). I’m willing to take that chance, but I’m not sure at all that DHS should be taking this step.
By the language in this directive, DoD agencies who have address the Defense Critical Infrastructure measures for the purpose of assuring mission success are supposed to consider CBRN survivability and CBRNE preparedness. But come on. I’ve never seen it outside of the Pentagon, and that was instituted in that building because of the 9/11 attack and fears that al Qaeda was coming back with CB warfare agents.
You infantry guys know it’s true. It’s not a normal part of your kit, you don’t need it for conventional operations, so the CBRN defense stuff is going to sit untouched on a shelf until there’s a unit inspection/accountability drill for the gear. If the NBC NCOs didn’t check your protective masks, you wouldn’t even open the mask carrier for a year.
There is a PPD-42 written during the Obama administration’s last year in office titled “Preventing and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Terrorism, and Use.” I’ve read it, it’s a piece of poorly written “cut and paste” sections from other documents. Pathetic.
Let’s be very clear that the ASD(NCB) is not an advocate for countering WMD. They can’t even advocate for CBRN defense acquisition. And don’t come at me with “well what about the DASD for Nuclear and CWMD Policy under OSD Policy?” It’s a flaccid office that thinks their main function is arms control because they get to go to Geneva. They can’t even keep the OSD acquisition shops in line as to what is actually a WMD priority for the military services and combatant commands. I don’t think much of the Joint Staff J5 or J8 offices either. They have no appetite to champion counter-WMD issues, all they do is referee the arguments between OSD and the services.
Corrode from within.🤷♂️