Nukes - What Are They Good For?

The Cold War Is Over - But Nukes Remain Relevant

It is sometimes difficult to present original discussions on nuclear weapons doctrine, strategy, or modernization. There are dozens of articles and books on nuclear weapons issues printed every year, often without saying much that’s new. It’s a very deep topic with a peculiar mix of international relations, technology, and military history. My own experience with nuclear weapons started as a second lieutenant serving in a nuke-capable artillery battalion (155mm self-propelled), back when the U.S. Army had tactical nukes. Being a Chemical Corps officer and had been schooled in basic nuclear weapons planning, the battalion commander decided I should learn about emergency authentication codes. I didn’t have to do much in that position, but hey, it was the late 1980s, the Cold War was still on. For two-thirds of my career, I stuck to chemical and biological defense programs and countering WMD policy. Then when I took the position of director, USAF Counterproliferation Center in 2013, I was told to get smart about nuclear deterrence strategy and operations as I was going to be responsible for teaching it to Airmen. This required breaking down complex policies and strategies to largely non-nuclear career fields, which I can do.

Most people believe that the role of nuclear weapons is to deter general war. Not the sole purpose, perhaps, but a primary one. Again, there are so many authors that discuss past and modern deterrence theory, I will not have much new to say but I will comment on U.S. deterrence debates as well as U.S. nuclear modernization programs. I have been heavily influenced by Colin Gray (Nuclear Strategy and National Style, Modern Strategy), Brad Roberts (The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century), Lawrence Freedman (Deterrence), Janne Nolan (Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy), and anything written or discussed by Amy Woolf (formerly with the Congressional Research Service). Colin Gray resonated with me when he said in Modern Strategy:

“The military impracticability of most forms of nuclear warfare, which appears to cast lethal doubt upon the strategic value of nuclear weapons, in fact has exactly the opposite effect in the wonderful world of statecraft. The awesome brutality of prospective nuclear use, though hard to tame for intended military effects, serves superbly as an instrument of political reassurance as the ultima ratio regis.”

The Cold War is over, and yet our delivery systems and nuclear weapons date from the Cold War. This creates an impression that nothing has changed in the U.S. nuclear posture. Critics disparage the U.S. government’s retention and modernization of these weapons by pointing out this fact and using the term “mutually assured destruction” (which isn’t a strategy, it’s an outcome - but I digress). Yet (paraphrasing Colin Gray) nuclear weapons exist, nuclear weapons are not going away, they will remain important in national security discussions, and the U.S. government has no responsible choice but to protect against their possible use by developing the issues within a national security strategy that addresses political policy objectives. Yet at the same time as national leaders say “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” one can see increasing pressure to develop new tactical nuclear weapons for a future war against nuclear superpowers.

The Center for a New American Security had an interesting article this past month, in which the authors wanted to examine the challenges of U.S.-China intrawar deterrence. This exercise examined U.S. nuclear escalation management in which the desire was to keep a conflict with China restrained to the use of theater nuclear weapons and not escalate to a strategic nuclear exchange. That is to say, here’s a think tank proposing that nuclear weapons have an operational use in future conflicts between superpowers. Their findings included that the United States was “ill-equipped in doctrine, capabilities, and concepts to manage this nuclear future” as well as “major divergences of opinion on nuclear retaliation that will likely challenge U.S. decision-makers.” This will require U.S. decision-makers to be better prepared to address “the troubling logic of theater nuclear use” and for military leaders to “fully integrate nuclear activities into U.S. planning and exercises.”

It’s an interesting read. I wanted to highlight a core aspect of the study, the need for conventional-nuclear integration (CNI) within a theater of operations. The term (originated by the Air Force, I think) has been used on and off for the past four to six years but hasn’t really caught on in national security discussions and importantly isn’t addressed within the services’ professional military education. It suggests that U.S. conventional forces could engage a nuclear power in a limited military operation (short of total war). This could lead to the use of adversarial tactical nuclear weapons and/or U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, limited to the theater of operations. But despite the concern about China’s and Russia’s expansion of their nuclear arsenals, the overwhelming majority of the U.S. military doesn’t think about nuclear warfare in a future conflict. There is an expectation that, in the event of a nuclear attack, U.S. Strategic Command will step in and do all of the nuclear planning and execution, so the geographic combatant commands who are in the fight don’t need to worry about nuclear planning and execution.

CNI was supposed to be the wake-up call to prepare the conventional force for the possibility of a nuclear power escalating from a regional conventional war to the use of limited nuclear strikes. This includes the possibility of U.S. tactical nuclear strikes. CNI is not, repeat not, the single focus of preparing U.S. forces to fight conventionally in a radiologically-contaminated environment. This PONI article suggests that if U.S. forces are better prepared for a theater nuclear war, to include having the ability to use tactical nukes in theater, this could deter China or Russia from attempting to coerce U.S. decision-makers during a future conflict. This depends, of course, on how one views the concept of deterrence. Would China, for instance, be less inclined to invade Taiwan if its leaders knew that the U.S. military forces had tactical nuclear weapons in theater? Or are the calls to increase U.S. nuclear forces just another case of “more bombs deter more” instead of being rooted in deterrence theory?

In addition to being a topical article, I thought this CNAS study could point out a few things about the U.S. nuclear enterprise using the Jones’ model of rationalists (policy-makers), technicians (operators), politicians (Congress), and reformers (advocates). There are a large number of engaged policy-makers, most of which have international relations degrees, who talk about the political nature of nuclear weapons and the implications of other nation-states’ nuclear programs. Political direction starts with the President of the United States and developed by the National Security Council. Representatives from OSD (Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Strategy), the State Department (Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security), and DOE (National Nuclear Security Administration) play big roles in developing this policy. The president outlines his nuclear weapons employment strategy - usually around the same time as the Nuclear Posture Review - and the executive agencies work out the details. These discussions address the question “What is the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy?”

We often talk about how nuclear weapons are more political instruments than military capabilities and as a result, policy discussions are driven from the highest level. Every presidential administration has put their own personal interpretation on how U.S. nuclear weapons would be used, sometimes in conflict with how military planners might desire. But here’s the real question for policy-makers today - why hasn’t there been a clear definition of what the U.S. government sees as conventional-nuclear integration, and does it have plans in place for using tactical nuclear weapons within a theater of operations? Is this “tailored deterrence” or “lowering the nuclear threshold”? Is escalation management really possible once the first nuke drops? Do we know enough about China’s and Russia’s nuclear postures to develop a rational nuclear deterrence concept that meets U.S. policy objectives?

The technical community is not as large as it used to be during the Cold War, when nuclear weapons were much more part of strategy and plans. Today, the U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command, and U.S. Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs office are the main actors. The U.S. Army Nuclear and Countering WMD Agency has a small planning function and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency has a supporting role for maintaining the DoD nuclear enterprise. The NNSA has its three national laboratories that deal with weapons design as well as its stockpile management mission (and a host of other agencies). The Nuclear Weapons Council brings the NNSA, OSD offices, Joint Staff (J3 and J5), the Air Staff and Navy Staff, and U.S. STRATCOM together to talk about the direction of nuclear modernization programs. The large majority of the armed forces don’t talk about nuclear weapons or deterrence concepts. But what will always be stressed at any open discussion of the DoD nuclear enterprise is the sanctity of the Strategic Triad.

We sometimes refer to the “nuclear priesthood” as this is a Very Special Group of people with their own technical jargon and Very Secret Squirrel topics, but we do not denigrate the Holy Trinity. Yes, there are those nuclear-capable fighter aircraft over in Europe and we do love them, but they exist as part of the air-based component. Technically speaking, both strategic bombers and the fighters qualified to carry nuclear bombs are “dual-capable” aircraft. We can argue as to the rational basis of the Triad, but it exists today, Congress insists that it continue, and Russia and China also want a Triad. After the Obama administration approved significant upgrades to all three legs of the Triad, nearly all talk by technical agencies has been on keeping the modernization program, estimated to cost $756 billion between 2023 to 2032, on schedule and on budget. That’s been a challenge, but 1) one not unfamiliar to other major defense agency programs, and 2) not one that Congress really cares about enough to cancel them.

To the point of the CNAS study, its authors believe that the United States doesn’t have enough tactical nuclear weapons, in particular those that might play a “nuclear antiship attack” role. This is probably a reference to the Submarine-Launched [or Sea-Launched] Cruise Missile (Nuclear), which has been a particular item of debate in the Biden administration’s term. Strangely enough, the study’s authors studiously avoid using that acronym. Notably, the Biden administration doesn’t want an SLCM-N program, and it’s unclear whether the Navy (dominated by surface fleet commanders) wants it. Adopting the SLCM-N for Navy attack submarines would be a significant (and costly) move that could jeopardize other valued DoD programs, so it’s a complex policy issue that the technical community doesn’t really want to address.

Congress has a Strategic Forces subcommittee in both the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees. As you might gather, they question the military commanders in charge of nuclear forces, DOE’s NNSA leadership, and other witnesses as desired. The reason why there is a Nuclear Posture Review is because Congress directed the DoD to provide it so as to better understand the administration’s policy and the technical issues involved in the nuclear weapons force. Congress has a very incrementalist approach to funding nearly any political issue, and nuclear weapons are not different in this respect. This is to say, there are no end of topics to discuss - nuclear adversaries, U.S. nuclear weapons modernization, U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies - but when it comes to moving funds, Congress will in nearly every case only make small movements up or down rather than outright cut programs or start new ones. No one is going to get rid of ICBMs because the congressional delegations in Montana, Wyoming, and North Dakota will not let that happen. While there is a lot of pressure on the Biden administration to fund research to develop the SLCM-N, Congress authorized only $190 million in FY24 toward development of a new system and $70 million to DOE for a new nuclear warhead. This isn’t enough to field a near-term capability, but it keeps certain factions happy that they’re making a point about the need to consider a larger nuclear arsenal.

Congress can be amazingly bipartisan on nuclear weapons programs. There are the outliers, the nuclear hawks and doves who push for more significant action, but it’s not a terribly divisive topic. Both sides support the nuclear modernization programs that involve the top defense contractors and both sides support military bases associated with nuclear weapons in their districts. Both sides are concerned about other countries having nuclear arsenals and believe that the U.S. military should address this threat. The 2023 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States had 12 members, evenly split between Democratic and Republican affiliations and well-respected as having experience on nuclear weapons-related issues. They all pushed for significant increases in both conventional and nuclear forces to confront nuclear-armed adversaries, but especially nuclear forces. I personally thought the Strategic Posture Commission’s report was flawed and was surprised to see prominent Democratic representatives basically adopt the Republican talking points, rather than to offer a more moderate view. Well, except for Frank Miller, he’s always been a nuclear hawk, even as a Democrat (truth in advertising, I do respect and always listen to Frank Miller’s perspective on nukes).

Reformists addressing the U.S. nuclear weapons program are many and diverse in their opinions. I am not going to list all of them other than to say, if you have an educated opinion about nuclear weapons, no matter the topic, you will find an advocacy group or think tank that matches your view. On the left side, you have the disarmament advocates, Ploughshares Fund, Arms Control Association, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, and Global Zero. On the right side, you have the nuclear superiority crowd, American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation, Hudson Institute, and National Institute for Public Policy. In the middle, you find CNAS, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Atlantic Council, Brookings Institute, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Stimson Center. There are many other groups with nuclear specialists. They all have excellent data collection and writing capabilities, and they all have agendas toward which they want to direct the White House, the U.S. civilian and military leadership, and Congress. And there’s nothing wrong with that. It’s good to have a healthy debate and the reformists present a lot of good data, even if they may ignore the feasibility of enacting their recommendations and identifying from where the federal funding would come.

What makes it really difficult to weigh in on issues such as “are nuclear weapons useful? what role will they play in future conflicts?” is the significant degree of secrecy surrounding these weapons. Everyone (in the national security community) is familiar with the security classifications of Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. When you’re in the DoD nuclear enterprise, there is also Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, and Critical Nuclear Weapons Design Information. It is impossible to openly discuss and quantify factors relating to U.S. nuclear weapons if the data are all highly classified. There are numerous classified meetings and reports that support U.S. government decisions, but for the public, we are all restricted to generalities and hypotheticals regarding the challenges of nuclear deterrence.

Regarding the CNAS study in general and the SLCM-N in particular, sure, I can see a case for the military utility of tactical nuclear weapons in a China scenario. I can also see a case for this or future administrations to say “no, that doesn’t meet our particular views of what a U.S. nuclear posture should be.” There are two sides, equally compelling, that this nuclear community is tugging back and forth. At the end of the day, however, if you believe that nuclear weapons are political in nature, it is up to the person holding office in the White House who gets to say what happens. Once that decision is made, the debate can go on, but the military has to develop capabilities in line with the national security strategy and develop concepts that allows the military to meet political objectives. Right now, that means no SLCM-N.