Here's How the U.S. Govt Could Get Iran's HEU
Scoring various scenarios from good to really, really bad
This will be a short post today. Last week, I was in Livermore, California, participating in a biosecurity conference hosted by the Center for Global Security Research. It was a really interesting two days, broadly covering issues such as nation-state and terrorist biological threats, the role of AI and biotech, private-public partnerships, public health concerns, and arms control. I was privileged to be on a panel discussing how nation-state biological weapons threats had changed from the Cold War days.1 There was a lot of discussion on the need for biosurveillance and biodeterrence in particular. I heard a good bit of optimism about the future of biotech, which is something I’m not used to hearing. I’m not going to cover the highlights here, but I’ll definitely be talking about biodeterrence in the near future.
Today I’m going to respond to a former colleague’s statement that we in the countering WMD community owe it to our citizens to provide a frank assessment as to how this administration might achieve its stated goal of removing 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Iran. This was in the context of my rather pessimistic assessment of such an effort. I am not going to address any aspect of seizing Iranian stockpiles of chemical or biological warfare agents, because I frankly don’t think they have an active CBW program and anyone who wants to scaremonger about this really should not be taken seriously.2
Let me note up front that I do not have any inside knowledge of current U.S. military operations or planning regarding this topic, nor did I do this during my military career. All of this is conjecture based on past exercises and operations. I’ll start by saying that I see three distinct variables in this exercise: whether Iran is cooperating or not, whether the location of the HEU is known or not, and whether the location is in one or many locations. I’m also assuming that Sylvester Stallone will not be pulling “The Expendables” team together for a covert run into Iran.3 Let’s go from ideal to absolutely shit outcomes.
Iran agrees to a cease-fire and lets an IAEA team enter the country to remove all of the HEU, with support by U.S. Air Force cargo planes, upon the condition to allow uranium enrichment under 20 percent.
This is the most ideal case, what I would call the Kazakhstan model, in which a compliant government (perhaps following the end of hostilities and a regime change) agrees to let an international team to enter the country and manage the operation of removing the HEU. There’s absolutely no need to try to remove this material in what the military calls a “non-permissive environment” (honestly, why can’t they just say “hostile environment”) if they don’t have to. The initial discussions with the Iranian government would be through arms control inspectors who were not U.S. citizens - just to keep everyone calm - but there could be agreement on two parts. First, that the U.S. Air Force gets to move all of the material to a third nation that would blend the HEU into their nuclear power reactors, and second, that Iran gets to continue some level of low-level enrichment for industrial and medical purposes.4 This would also be contingent upon the return of regular IAEA inspections.
After a few weeks of on-the-ground negotiations, the IAEA teams go to Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, where the Iranian government has consolidated the 440 kilograms of HEU. The material is assessed, tagged, and sealed in containers, and then moved by the Iranians to a nearby airbase. From there, Air Force cargo planes move the HEU to the United States for processing and use in nuclear power plants. Nice and easy, no drama, everyone having a good time. Minimal U.S. involvement, still meets the president’s objective. Of course, this doesn’t stop Iran from the option of going back to a covert nuclear research program at a later date. We all understand that he best way to avoid being attacked by another nation-state is to own a nuclear weapon. Or two or three.
Iran agrees to a cease-fire and lets an IAEA team (with U.S. officials) enter the country to regulate its nuclear research program, but slow-rolls the release of the HEU. Iran still wants some low-level uranium enrichment.
This scenario is more of a variant of the first case, in which Iran’s regime has not fallen but they want a respite from the air (and ground?) attacks. This is the 1991 post-war Iraq scenario. They pursue the diplomatic route and agree to allowing arms control inspectors into the country, to include U.S. officials, and open up its known nuclear research programs for unobstructed inspection. This could include installing monitors and cameras to enforce the conditions of the negotiations. But Iran’s officials say that they lost track of the HEU, that it’s buried under rubble, and they delay the release of any actual materials while rebuilding their civilian and military infrastructure. Maybe they release some of the 440 kilograms, but do not allow any visits to covert, underground facilities where hundreds of centrifuges continue spinning. IAEA teams continue to push for Iranian cooperation for years, but Iran is hoping that everyone’s just tired of the conflict (and the high price of oil) and continues to stall on compliance agreements. The tacit threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon remains.
Iran’s current regime collapses, but the IRGC still has all of its power. A U.S. military force launches an operation into Iran to take the HEU, which is stored in one central facility in Isfahan.
Iran’s regime has continued to take punishing losses but holds fast and still has a significant conventional military and security force. The president decides that he needs a victory Iran’s HEU must be removed immediately, and the intelligence community assures him that it’s all consolidated at one location. The U.S. military invasion force has a Marine Expeditionary Force and the 10th Mountain Division landing in Bandar Abbas and fanning out to hold the immediate ground nearest to the Strait of Hormuz and to develop a strongpoint on Iranian soil to support ground operations. The 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division, and the 75th Ranger Regiment airdrop into Isfahan and create a secure perimeter around the research facilities. Army engineers fly heavy equipment into the perimeter while U.S. air power provides some degree of protection for U.S. ground forces. Army CBRN specialists (20th CBRNE) follow to oversee the packaging of the HEU, which are moved by CH-47 Chinooks to Al Dafra Air Base in the UAE. During this time, the IRGC assaults the perimeter and the U.S. forces at Bandar Abbas with artillery and drones, as well as conducting small-unit attacks around the clock. U.S. casualties for the week-long operation amount to more than a thousand dead and wounded. Iranian casualties (civilian and military) mount into the tens of thousands.
Iran’s current regime continues to hold power while a U.S. military force launches a special ops task force into that country to take the HEU, which has been moved to Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan.
This is just a variant of the previous scenario, except that it is more deadly given that Iranian military forces may be coordinated in their efforts and prepared to repel U.S. military forces. The extraction operation takes over two months and casualties are three times what the prior scenario described. Iranian artillery and drones continuously hit U.S. combat units and regional bases, supported by Russian intelligence. Heavy Iranian military attacks cause the U.S. forces to spend more time maintaining security for the extraction operations. There’s no support from the GCC, but Israeli air power continues to be involved. Following the removal operations, the Iranian regime declares victory in expelling the U.S. invasion force and immediately begins to rebuild its nuclear research program. Within a year, U.S. intelligence sources detect a nuclear explosion in the western Iranian desert.
Regime collapse occurs. The IRGC conducts an insurgent campaign as the U.S. military force launches into Iran to take the HEU from five dispersed locations known to U.S. intelligence sources.
Then we have the 2003 WMD hunt in Iraq on steroids. U.S. intelligence has identified multiple locations where Iran has stored HEU. There is no coordinated defense at any of the locations, but it’s a race to seize the HEU before insurgent groups take the material for use to develop multiple radiological dispersal devices. U.S. SOCOM and Army’s 20th CBRNE deploy specialized teams to follow airborne/air assault forces into each location to package and move the material out of the country. Violence is sporadic as small IRGC teams continue to hit U.S. convoys and mortar the bases of operation. By raiding the locations and not staying on the ground, the U.S. casualties are not as significant as previous scenarios, but the exploitation teams only find 340 kilograms of uranium. The new Iranian government - when it is formed months later - promises to abide by IAEA inspections and offers continued support. However, intelligence sources suggest that Iran has built new covert underground research facilities that are not made available for inspection.
Iran’s current regime continues to hold power and has dispersed its HEU stockpile into a dozen different locations in unknown locations in the mountains of western Iran. The U.S. military deploys a force twice the size of 2003’s Iraq invasion to subdue the nation’s military and get the HEU.
Over a six-month period, U.S. forces build up bases in Saudi Arabia and move significant military forces (larger than the 2003 invasion force) to initiate Operation Desert Beatdown, the overthrow of the Iranian regime and retrieval of HEU. The Saudis and Israelis support U.S. military operations, but the GCC is only offering condemnation of the hostilities as Iranian missiles and drones continue to hit their cities. None of the GCC states other than Saudi Arabia are allowing U.S. forces to operate from or over their national boundaries. The amphib/air assault invasion force crosses the Persian Gulf into Iran, sets up a major operations node in Busheher, and starts to work its way on the ground traveling northwest toward Tehran. Iranian artillery and drones continuously hit U.S. units, supported by Russian intelligence. Shi’ite militias from Iraq start to attack U.S. embassies and military forces in the region, joined by Houthi forces and Hezbollah. The president demands NATO support his operation, and no one responds. U.S military forces continue a massively destructive campaign against Iranian industrial sites as oil prices soar over $250 per barrel. The regime eventually falls and U.S. forces occupy Tehran, supporting the initiation of a new “moderate” government. While the U.S. exploitation teams quickly fan out to search the locations, after two years of occupation, none of the HEU is recovered. Reports suggest that it was moved into northern Iraq, but the Iraqi government (trying desperately to keep U.S. forces out) denies any such movements. U.S. casualties amount to 3,000 dead and 10,000 wounded, while Iranian casualties soar to over 150,000 dead and wounded.
There are probably other variations on this theme. I’m not trying to address all the possible options, merely trying to suggest that attempting to grab Iran’s HEU can be better addressed through a cooperative effort with Iran’s government - whoever is in place at the time - than heavy military operations that (to be honest) will have more of a focus on eliminating the regime than getting 440 kilograms of HEU. The HEU is an rationale, not a main objective, of the president’s ambitions. I don’t believe that any White House musings over a short, quick special ops mission have any real basis, because any military advisors to the president ought to outline how such an operation would quickly drag down into a really bad experience. Not what the Republicans want or need right before the mid-term U.S. elections.
There are better U.S. policy options. A rational president would want to reassure regional allies and friends as to U.S. support for stability in the Middle East, to strengthen its preemptive and retaliatory capabilities instead of frittering them away, and to reinforce dissuasion messages and nonproliferation regimes instead of eschewing them. I look over the past few decades when U.S. presidents and politicians have sternly stated “Iran must not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon” and I wonder sometimes if they realize how this rhetoric has failed to actually address the political challenge of the Middle East. North Korean leaders heard that same message during the 1990s and shrugged and did it anyway. The United States (and Russia) cannot just bomb its way into achieving its political objectives. It’s a domestic show more than a national mandate. Meanwhile, we have to sit and listen to the idiotic ramblings of U.S. senators and representatives trying to suggest that all of this is to “protect the United States.” Trying to forcibly remove Iran’s HEU is, in fact, not going to protect the United States and instead will imperil its future stability.
Many thanks to conference host Brad Roberts for the invite and to my panel colleague Seth Carus. I appreciated getting to interact with the very interesting people working in this area.
There’s no evidence that Iran has the necessary stockpiles and delivery systems to have a mature CB warfare capability to support a military combat operation. Please don’t pester me with any discussion of Iran’s alleged development of fentanyl-related compounds for the purposes of internal security operations. That is not even close to the basis of a nation-state chemical weapons program. Just get out of here with that nonsense.
By the way, Sly, I’m very disappointed in you. You know what you did. Just inexcusable.
By the terms of the NPT, Iran is permitted to enrich uranium for commercial purposes. There’s no sense trying to enforce a “no enrichment at all” demand, that’s just unreasonable.
Great post that sheds light on just how challenging the scenarios where Iranian government cooperation is lacking actually are. And as the quibbler-in-chief around these parts (sorry!), I feel the need to point out that uranium, of any enrichment level, and in either solid or gaseous form, makes a poor radiological (or "dirty") weapon. Until it's been irradiated in a reactor or bomb, the stuff just isn't very radioactive, though the more-enriched stuff somewhat more so than the less-enriched stuff. But modest radioactivity aside, UF6 gas is particularly nasty stuff, both highly corrosive and notably poisonous
Very useful and thorough thinking! How about a variant of your first scenario that could potentially be more palatable? In this version, the U.S. accepts President Putin's recent offer for Rosatom, Iran's civil nuclear partner, to move the enriched uranium to Russia along with a team of IAEA safeguards inspectors, and perhaps a U.S. observer or two, at least one being a current (or former) nuclear expert from a DOE national laboratory.