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Gene Godbold's avatar

I think a fair number of DTRA WMD folks have been absorbed, en masse, into another portion of DoD. I used to work on BTRP/CBEP (also as a contractor). Parts of it were interesting, but I agree it is an odd job. Would the folks in those countries working on CBEP-funded initiatives *really* get into trouble (WMD-type trouble) if the funding wasn't there? It seems like a reach.

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Rick Turville's avatar

Erosion by Design? Funding Cuts and the Shrinking of U.S. CWMD Capabilities

Over the past few years, U.S. government investment in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defense has been gradually reduced, resulting in a measurable erosion of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) capabilities. Although no reorganization or public strategy shift has explicitly endorsed downsizing, a combination of funding cuts, programmatic realignments, and shifting national security priorities has initiated a quiet but persistent contraction.

At the DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) — historically one of the government's principal organizations for WMD counteraction — has absorbed successive budget reductions. Between FY2020 and FY2024, DTRA's CWMD-specific programs faced cumulative funding declines of approximately 15%, according to Congressional Research Service reports and annual NDAA appropriations. Notably, funding reductions disproportionately impacted deployable response capabilities, operational field support, and tactical detection programs, while strategic deterrence initiatives received relative protection.

Similarly, within the Department of Homeland Security, the CWMD Office, originally established as a standalone entity in 2018 to centralize CBRN detection, warning, and incident response, has seen its budget cut by nearly 20% since its peak funding levels in FY2019. DHS's FY2025 Budget Request further proposes realigning some CWMD functions into broader emergency management structures, effectively diluting the office's unique focus on WMD threats.

These funding trends have been exasperbated by DOGE impacts on DTRA and DHS and will have operational consequences. The National Guard's Civil Support Teams (CSTs) — 57 teams nationally — continue to maintain basic readiness standards but have experienced constrained modernization budgets, impacting their ability to replace aging equipment, acquire advanced detection tools, and support specialized training. Unit sustainment funding has flattened, and key technology refreshes, such as mobile analytical labs and updated survey suits, are increasingly deferred.

The Environmental Protection Agency's Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental CollectionTechnology (ASPECT) - the Nation's only only 24/7 airborne emergency response capability- has not responded to a NSSE or SEAR event in 5 years.

The USMC Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), a national-level force designed for mass casualty CBRN response, has also faced resource tightening. CBIRF’s budget allocation for specialized equipment procurement and sustainment dropped by roughly 12% over the last two fiscal years. Training throughput has been reduced, and force structure reviews have proposed streamlining CBIRF to a smaller contingency response model.

The policy rationale for these reductions stems largely from an evolving threat prioritization. The 2022 National Defense Strategy emphasized strategic competition with China and Russia over counterterrorism and homeland defense missions. Consequently, "low-probability, high-consequence" CBRN events are increasingly seen as secondary risks in the current strategic environment, leading to resource reallocations away from domestic CWMD capabilities.

Yet, this risk calculus is not without potential consequences. While large-scale WMD attacks are rare, the complexity and accessibility of chemical and biological agents — especially in an era of proliferating synthetic biology and industrial chemical production — continue to pose asymmetric threats. Reductions in forward-deployed, rapid response CBRN capabilities could significantly impact national resilience to catastrophic or cascading events.

In short, while there has been no formal policy declaring a retrenchment of CWMD capabilities, funding reductions, capability consolidation, and force structure re-evaluations are incrementally achieving that effect. The United States may find itself increasingly reliant on general-purpose emergency response forces rather than specialized WMD response units — a trade-off whose true costs may only become clear during a crisis.

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